The Conundrum of Covered Bonds by Schwarcz, Steven L.
561
 The Conundrum of Covered Bonds 
 Steven L. Schwarcz * 
 Covered bonds, which have been part of European fi nance since the time of Frederick the 
Great, are now being widely touted as the answer to securitization’s imperfections. There is 
great confusion, though, about the nature of covered bonds and their relationship to secured 
bond fi nancing and securitization. This article attempts to demystify covered bonds, examin-
ing how they fi t within a larger fi nancing framework, analyzing their legal rights and obliga-
tions, and comparing their costs and benefi ts. The benefi ts of covered bonds are similar to 
those of securitization; both can access low-cost capital market funding with low risk to their 
investors, and both can be used to regenerate lending markets. The costs of covered bonds 
may be higher, though, because the “dynamic” collateral pools and “dual” recourse to the 
issuer that protect covered bonds shift virtually all risk to unsecured creditors. Whether that 
risk should be allowed to be shifted so asymmetrically is a policy question for any nascent 
covered bond regime . 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 Market observers have noted that although some securitization products, such 
as structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”) and highly leveraged “ABS CDO” secu-
rities, 1 may be gone forever from the capital markets, they will be replaced. The 
most likely candidate to replace these products is covered bonds, which have a 
long history in European securities markets and are being touted by governments 
and market observers alike. 2 Investment bankers and law fi rms are investing in 
getting up to speed in this area to develop and market their expertise before this 
becomes the next “next thing.” 3 
 Covered bonds are long-term debt securities that are secured by specifi c assets 
of the issuer of the bonds. 4 The collateral assets are called “cover-pool” assets. 5 To 
the extent the cover-pool assets are insuffi cient to repay principal and interest on 
the covered bonds, investors in the bonds (covered “bondholders”) have an unse-
cured claim against the issuer for the insuffi ciency. 6 As with any granting of collat-
eral, the cover-pool assets are deemed to remain on the issuer’s balance sheet (i.e., 
they remain owned by the issuer) for accounting purposes. 7 Unlike normal collat-
eral, however, these assets are “ring-fenced” to give covered bondholders greater 
protection in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy. 8 Additionally, weak cover-pool 
1. For an introduction to these securities, see infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Statement on 
Covered Bond Best Practices ( July 28, 2009) (HP-1101), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp1101.aspx [hereinafter Treasury Press Release] (“I believe covered bonds 
have the potential to increase mortgage fi nancing, improve underwriting standards, and strengthen 
U.S. fi nancial institutions by providing a new funding source that will diversify their overall port-
folio.”); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
BUS. 549, 604–05 (2009) (arguing that the recent fi nancial crisis “offers an opportunity to rethink 
the securitization model, and perhaps, structure a new approach that is both effi ciency-enhancing, as 
well as sustainable over time” and suggesting covered bonds as one alternative); Press Release, CRE 
Fin. Council, CRE Finance Council Urges Support for U.S. Covered Bond Market ( July 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.crefc.org/About_CMSA/Press_Releases/2010/CRE_Finance_Council_Urges_
Support_for_U_S__Covered_Bond_Market/ (supporting legislation to create a U.S. legislative covered 
bond regime as an additional fi nancing tool for commercial real estate markets, though not suggesting 
a complete supplanting of commercial mortgage securitization); MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE IN FOCUS: A SHORT GUIDE TO COVERED BONDS 1 (2010) [hereinafter A SHORT GUIDE TO COVERED 
BONDS] (observing that “interest is beginning to converge on covered bonds” as a “complementary 
fi nancing technique[]”); Commercial Real Estate: A Chicago Perspective on Current Market Challenges 
and Possible Responses: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 111th 
Cong. 12–14 (2010) (statement of Ken Born, Senior Managing Dir., PPM America, for the Commercial 
Real Estate Finance Council).
3. E-mail from Martin Fingerhut, Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, and Co-Chair, Committee 
on Securitization and Structured Finance of the ABA Section of Business Law, to author (Apr. 6, 2010, 
23:10 EST) (on fi le with The Business Lawyer); see also Sam Jones, The Long Arm of the Law: Covered 
Bonds Are Breaking Free of the Legislation that Made Them, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 21, 23 (2007).
4. See A SHORT GUIDE TO COVERED BONDS, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Id.
6. The actual order of payment may vary. See, e.g., id. at 3 (indicating that, absent default, the issuer 
typically pays covered bonds from its cash fl ow, with the cover-pool assets serving as collateral; if the 
issuer defaults in payment, the investors receive payment from the cover-pool assets and also have an 
unsecured claim against the issuer if such assets are insuffi cient to pay the investors in full).
7. See id. at 2.
8. For a discussion of ring-fencing, see infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
The Conundrum of Covered Bonds 563
assets are required to be replaced by good-quality assets throughout the life of the 
covered bonds, thereby maintaining a requisite level of “overcollateralization”—a 
surplus of collateral value over indebtedness. 9 To ensure this is all enforceable 
by covered bondholders against other creditors of the issuer, some countries 
have promulgated specifi c covered bond legislation (a “legislative” covered bond 
regime). 10 Absent such legislation, covered bondholders must rely on contractual 
protections and related commercial law (a “structured” covered bond regime). 11 
 This article, which is both descriptive and normative, proceeds as follows. It 
fi rst examines the history of covered bonds and reviews the covered bond mar-
ket that exists today. It then deconstructs and demystifi es covered bonds as a 
fi nancing tool, arguing that covered bonds should be viewed conceptually as be-
longing to the broader category of structured fi nance, a category that includes 
securitization. 12 In that context, the article analyzes how covered bonds relate 
to both securitization and bond fi nance generally, demonstrating that covered 
bonds incorporate fundamental fi nancial and legal elements of both. 13 Finally, the 
article examines how normative critiques of securitization might apply to covered 
bonds, asking whether the long history in Europe of covered bonds, as well as an 
obscuring of substance behind the innocuous name, give covered bonds an aura 
of innocence that may not be wholly deserved. 
 A. HISTORY OF COVERED BONDS 
 Covered bonds emerged in eighteenth century Prussia with the inception of the 
Pfandbrief. 14 In the wake of the Seven Years War, King Frederick the Great intro-
duced a new mortgage fi nance mechanism to restore liquidity for Prussia’s landed 
gentry whose lands and fi nancial position had been battered by the confl ict. 15 In 
1769 he issued a decree mandating the establishment of public law associations 
 9. See A SHORT GUIDE TO COVERED BONDS, supra note 2, at 3.
10. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
11. Structured covered bond regimes are contractual. See, e.g., Frank Packer et al., The Covered Bond 
Market, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2007, at 43, 44. For an analysis of the differences between legislative and 
structured covered bond regimes, see infra notes 53–64 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1562 (2004) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitiza-
tion, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 148 n.52 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Alchemy] (explaining that 
because securitization is specifi c asset recourse only whereas regular debt is full recourse, securitiza-
tion increases or leaves static the expected value of unsecured creditors’ claims on issuer/borrower 
while secured debt has an ambiguous impact on the expected value of such claims).
13. For example, securitization can be treated, for accounting purposes, as either an off-balance-
sheet sale of receivables or an on-balance-sheet transfer while still performing its key fundraising and 
risk transfer functions. It is possible to structure a securitization as a true sale for bankruptcy purposes, 
but not necessarily for accounting purposes, allowing the originator to raise funds and transfer credit 
risk while retaining the securitized assets on its balance sheet. Compare STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 4:2-6, at 4-6 to 4-7 (3d ed. 2010) [herein-
after SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE], with infra note 73 (explaining the factors considered in determining 
true sale status for bankruptcy and accounting purposes, respectively).
14. History of the Mortgage Bank Act, VERBAND DEUTSCHER PFANDBRIEFBANKEN [ASS’N OF GERMAN PFANDBRIEF 
BANKS], http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_116.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
15. Id.
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of landed nobles (“Landschaften”) that could access agricultural credit by issuing 
full recourse bonds using the nobles’ estates as collateral. 16 Landschaft members 
had a right to credit from the association, which was delivered in the form of a 
security (the Pfandbriefe) that a member could sell to investors to raise cash. 17 In 
1900, the German Mortgage Bank Act established a formal framework in law for 
the Pfandbrief system and codifi ed features such as the ring-fencing of cover-pool 
assets on an issuer’s balance sheet and investors’ recourse to both the asset pool 
and the issuer in the event of default. 18 
 During the nineteenth century, the Pfandbrief system proliferated throughout 
Europe and, as the century drew to a close, became a popular method of refi nanc-
ing public sector debt. 19 Covered bonds waned in infl uence after the mid-twentieth 
century and were largely displaced by retail deposits as a source of mortgage 
fi nancing. 20 Then, in the 1990s, the market for covered bonds was revitalized by 
introduction of the German benchmark Pfandbrief in 1995 and also by investor 
demand for securities diversifi cation in response to the introduction of the Euro, 
which hampered the ability to use currencies to diversify investments. 21 
 B. TODAY’S COVERED BOND MARKET 
 Although covered bonds historically have been primarily a European phenom-
enon, they are beginning to extend their reach to North America and Asia. U.S. 
issuers entered the covered bond market with Washington Mutual’s inaugural 
structured covered bond issue in September 2006. 22 Bank of America subse-
quently made its fi rst covered bonds issuance, in March 2007. 23 The U.S. Con-
gress is currently considering a legislative covered bond regime to supplement 
and perhaps replace structured covered bond offerings. 24 
 The Royal Bank of Canada became the fi rst Canadian issuer of covered bonds, 
in November 2007, followed up by a second issue in March 2010. 25 Kookmin 
Bank became the fi rst non-Japanese Asian issuer of covered bonds when it sold 
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; BARCLAYS CAPITAL & MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, COVERED BONDS 3 (May 2010) [hereinafter 
COVERED BONDS] (on fi le with The Business Lawyer).
19. Ralf Burmeister et al., Overview of Covered Bonds, in ECBC EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 85, 
86 (Wolfgang Kälberer et al. ed., 2009).
20. Id. at 86.
21. Id.
22. Washington Mutual: $5.1 Billion in Covered Bonds Sold in Europe, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2006, at 
C2.
23. Fitch Assigns BA Covered Bond Issuer US Covered Bonds Final ‘AAA’ Rating, BUS. WIRE, July 3, 
2007.
24. On March 18, 2010, Representative Scott Garrett (R-NJ) and co-sponsors Rep. Paul E. Kan-
jorski (D-PA) and Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL) introduced the United States Covered Bond Act of 
2010, H.R. 4884, 111th Cong. (2010) (later renumbered as H.R. 5823). This bill has been recom-
mended by the House Committee on Financial Services for consideration by the full U.S. House of 
Representatives.
25. Andrew Fitzpatrick et al., Room to Grow in the Canadian Covered Bond Market, CAN. STRUCTURED 
FIN. NEWSL. (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.dbrs.com/research/232521.
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$1 billion of bonds in May 2009. 26 And New Zealand entered the covered bond 
market with the recent announcement of a NZ$425 million covered bond issue 
by the Bank of New Zealand. 27 
 Worldwide, by 2009 twenty-nine countries had either enacted specifi c covered 
bond legislation or allowed structured covered bonds based on extant contract 
and commercial law. 28 Volume is also growing. By the end of 2008, the amount of 
covered bonds outstanding in Europe alone was approximately €2.38 trillion, up 
from €1.5 trillion in 2003. 29 
 The recent global fi nancial crisis only temporarily halted this growth. Although 
the market for covered bonds, like all fi nancial securities markets, was affected, 30 
the European Central Bank (“ECB”) responded with a €60 billion program to pur-
chase covered bonds, an action that “revived” the market and caused interest-rate 
“spreads” to narrow. 31 More recently, the ECB has taken steps to increase further 
the liquidity of the covered bonds market. 32 Market observers indeed see covered 
bonds as an antidote for some of the problems that led to the fi nancial crisis. 33 
26. Rafael Nam & Carolyn Cohn, Kookmin Sells $1 Bln Worth of Covered Bonds, REUTERS (May 6, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/06/kookmin-bonds-idUSHKG23656320090506.
27. Lucy Craymer, UPDATE: BNZ Set to Be 1st Australasian Bank to Sell Covered Bonds, DOW JONES 
INT’L NEWS SERV., June 14, 2010.
28. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 90. Europe has both legislative and structured covered bond 
regimes. Germany, France, Spain, and some other EU countries have legislative regimes. E-mail from 
Rick Watson, Managing Dir., European Securitisation Forum, to author (Apr. 11, 2010, 15:18 EST) 
(on fi le with The Business Lawyer). The Netherlands and France are effectively structured regimes. 
Packer et al., supra note 11, at 44. The United States, presently a structured regime, is considering 
adding a legislative regime. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. In some countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, covered bonds are issued under both legislative and structured regimes. E-mail 
from Rick Watson, supra. Sometimes also, legislative and structured regimes overlap, illustrated by 
“enhanced covered bonds” that rely on contract to add investor protections to legislative covered 
bonds. Jonathan Golin, Uncovering Covered Bonds, in COVERED BONDS: BEYOND PFANDBRIEFE: INNOVATIONS, 
INVESTMENT AND STRUCTURED ALTERNATIVES 11, 15 ( Jonathan Golin ed., 2006).
29. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 88 (relying on data provided by the European Covered Bond 
Council). So-called “benchmark” covered bonds—Euro-denominated, bullet maturity, fi xed annual 
coupon bonds with a defi ned minimum outstanding volume—are, after government-issued securities, 
the largest European bond market with an outstanding volume of about €840 billion. Id. at 93. The 
largest issuers of covered bonds in the fi rst quarter of 2010 were, respectively, France, Spain, Germany, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. COVERED BONDS, supra note 18, at 21. However, in recent years, the 
leading issuers have usually been, in order, Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Spain. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 92. In 2008, these latter fi ve states had a cumulative volume 
of outstanding covered bonds in excess of €1.9 trillion or more than 80 percent of all outstanding 
European covered bonds. Id. at 92–93.
30. Ralf Burmeister, Introduction, in ECBC EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 25, 25 (Wolfgang 
Kälberer et al. ed., 2009) (reporting that interest-rate spreads on covered bonds widened as capital 
markets froze).
31. Frank Will & Sophia Kwon, Was the ECB Covered Bond Purchase Programme a Success?, in ECBC 
EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 27, 27 (Wolfgang Kälberer et al. ed., 2009). An interest-rate “spread” 
on securities is the differential between the interest rate on those securities and the interest rate on 
risk-free securities (such as U.S. Government treasury securities) of similar maturities. The smaller 
the spread, the safer the market regards the securities. Thus, narrowing spreads signals reduced risk, 
whereas widening spreads signals increased risk.
32. Jennifer Hughes, Outlook for Covered Bonds Brightens, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 5, 2010, at 25.
33. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. But cf. Jay Surti, Can Covered Bonds Resuscitate 
Residential Mortgage Finance in the United States? 6–7, 21 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/10/277, Dec. 
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 II. DECONSTRUCTING COVERED BONDS 
  A. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COVERED BONDS 
 There is no formal international convention or treaty 34 defi ning covered bonds. 35 
They are instead defi ned, de facto, by their characteristics, of which the discussion 
below highlights the most typical. Terminology is loose, however. Characteristics 
evolve over time, and sometimes market participants refer to secured bonds lack-
ing one or more of the typical characteristics or having additional characteristics 
as “covered” bonds. 
 Two typical characteristics of covered bonds appear to be critical: they are se-
cured by collateral (often required by legislation to be high-quality assets such 
as mortgage loans or government debt 36 ), and they have unsecured recourse 
against the issuer in the event of a collateral defi ciency (often referred to as “dual 
2010) (questioning whether an important reason for the better performance, in the fi nancial crisis, of 
European covered bonds than U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities was that “[g]reater lender 
recourse [i.e., mortgage lenders in Europe have recourse claims against defaulting mortgagors whose 
collateral is insuffi cient] and slower debt extinction in European countries [due to less ability of de-
faulting mortgagors to avoid their debt obligations in bankruptcy] weakens borrowers’ incentive to 
default relative to the U.S. when the mortgage goes under water”).
34. The European Union’s directive on the coordination of laws, regulations, and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (“UCITS”) in-
cludes a provision applicable to covered bonds that
are issued by a credit institution which has its registered offi ce in a Member State and is subject 
by law to special public supervision designed to protect bond-holders. In particular, sums deriv-
ing from the issue of those bonds shall be invested in accordance with the law in assets which, 
during the whole period of validity of the bonds, are capable of covering claims attaching to the 
bonds and which, in the event of failure of the issuer, would be used on a priority basis for the 
reimbursement of the principal and payment of the accrued interest.
2009 O.J. (L 302) 63. The EU’s Capital Requirements Directive (“CRD”) incorporates this defi nition 
by reference and adds restrictions on the nature of cover-pool assets permitted in covered bonds. 2006 
O.J. (L 177) 89. Neither is an exhaustive defi nition, leaving space for EU Member State legislation 
to defi ne covered bonds fully. Defi nitions included in the EU regulations also appear in the special 
context of capital requirements and are not general, statutory defi nitions of covered bonds; indeed 
some structured covered bonds operate outside their purview. Nor do they apply to the increasingly 
numerous covered bond issues in non-EU jurisdictions.
35. The European Covered Bond Council offers the following as “essential characteristics” of cov-
ered bonds from either legislative or structured regimes:
1. The bond is issued by—or bondholders otherwise have full recourse to—a credit institution 
which is subject to public supervision and regulation; 2. Bondholders have a claim against a cover 
pool of fi nancial assets in priority to the unsecured creditors of the credit institution; 3. The credit 
institution has the ongoing obligation to maintain suffi cient assets in the cover pool to satisfy the 
claims of covered bondholders at all times; 4. The obligations of the credit institution in respect 
of the cover pool are supervised by public or other independent bodies.
Essential Features of Covered Bonds, EUR. COVERED BOND COUNCIL, http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/default.
asp?PageID=503 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). The ECBC stresses that these are “minimum standards” 
used by the Council to defi ne covered bonds and are not an offi cial defi nition. Id. Subject to that 
minimum, each EU jurisdiction that has covered bond legislation therefore can set its own prescriptive 
standards for cover-pool assets.
36. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 87, 90–91.
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 recourse”). 37 In covered bond transactions, it is also standard for the cover-pool 
assets to remain on the issuer’s balance sheet for accounting purposes. 38 None-
theless, these assets are usually “ring-fenced” to protect covered bond investors 
in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy. Although the term is not well-defi ned, 39 
ring-fencing in a covered bond context entails segregating the cover-pool as-
sets to protect them from claims of the issuer’s creditors, other than the covered 
bondholders, in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy. 40 In legislative regimes, ring- 
fencing is usually accomplished by statutory fi at separating the cover-pool assets 
from the issuer’s insolvency estate or creating a priority claim against those as-
sets. 41 In structured regimes, ring-fencing often involves selling the cover-pool as-
sets to a wholly owned, bankruptcy-remote SPV subsidiary. 42 The goal is to ensure 
that other creditors have access to cover-pool assets only if and when the covered 
bonds have been paid in full. 43 
 Another defi ning characteristic of covered bonds is that weak cover-pool as-
sets are typically replaced by good-quality assets throughout the life of the bonds 
(cover pools so replenished are sometimes called “dynamic” cover pools), thereby 
maintaining the requisite overcollateralization. In a legislative regime, the statute 
sets the minimum level of overcollateralization and dictates that a monitor be ap-
37. Dual recourse is the characteristic that most distinguishes covered bonds from securitization and 
other forms of “non-recourse” fi nancing, in which investors have recourse solely to the collateral. See 
infra note 68 and accompanying text; see also A SHORT GUIDE TO COVERED BONDS, supra note 2, at 2 (“The 
distinguishing characteristic of covered bonds is that they are ‘dual recourse’ debt instruments.”).
38. Bernard Volk, RMBS vs. Covered Bonds, in ECBC EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 100, 103 
(Wolfgang Kälberer et al. ed., 2009).
39. “Ring-fencing” can have many meanings. In addition to the meaning used in this article—the 
protection of collateral assets from claims by most creditors for the benefi t of a particular class of 
creditors—the term may also refer, inter alia, to “the practice of fi ling a bankruptcy petition on behalf 
of a subsidiary of a corporate parent company, while preserving the integrity of the parent and siblings 
of the debtor, as well as any distributions that may have been made to those affi liates,” Marcus Cole, 
Limiting Liability Through Bankruptcy, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1245, 1274–75 (2002), and the inaccessibility 
of some assets of a transnational debtor when the jurisdiction in which those assets are held does not 
recognize the extraterritorial validity of the laws of the jurisdiction in which creditors have brought 
their claims, Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27 INT’L LAW. 429, 
431 (1993).
40. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 97–98. Implicit in the concept of ring-fencing is that pay-
ment on covered bonds is not interrupted, thereby enabling covered bondholders to receive their 
contractually bargained rate of return. If payment were interrupted and the bonds were accelerated, 
covered bondholders would be exposed (even if paid in full) to reinvestment risk—that the rate of 
return on redeployed funds would be less than that on the covered bonds.
41. Id.
42. Id. Sometimes the SPV enters into a guaranteed investment contract (“GIC”) or other derivatives 
contract to invest cover-pool proceeds, especially during a default, to ensure that the return thereon is 
suffi cient to cover interest on the covered bonds. Huxley Somerville, The ABCs of U.S. Covered Bonds, 
COM. MORTGAGE SEC. ASS’N, Winter 2009, at 36, 36.
43. Although confusing, some refer to the protection offered by ring-fencing for cover-pool as-
sets as bankruptcy-segregation rather than bankruptcy remoteness. Golin, supra note 28, at 33–34 
(distinguishing bankruptcy remoteness—the legal independence of one corporate entity from another 
for bankruptcy purposes—from bankruptcy segregation—the sheltering of certain assets from claims 
by ordinary creditors). Note that in some structured covered bonds, the cover-pool assets are held by 
a bankruptcy-remote SPV. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
568 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 66, May 2011
pointed by the issuer, subject to regulatory approval, to oversee and periodically 
test the cover pool to ensure it meets the statutory standards. 44 Issuers are thus 
legally obligated to maintain cover-pool levels, usually by adding new assets to the 
pool. 45 In a structured regime, the process is essentially the same but is mandated 
by contract and usually enforced by an independent auditor and a cover-pool 
trustee. 46 Rating agencies may also infl uence the level of overcollateralization and 
the composition of cover-pool assets. 
 Finally, especially in legislative regimes, it is typical for issuers of covered bonds 
to be banks or other government-regulated fi nancial institutions. 47 
 Covered Bonds Distinguished from Ordinary Secured Bonds 
 The literature discussing covered bonds does not adequately differentiate them 
from ordinary secured bonds, which are long-term debt securities secured by as-
sets of the issuer with full unsecured recourse to the issuer in the event of a collat-
eral defi ciency. Thus, as with covered bonds, 48 secured bonds entitle their holders 
to an unsecured claim for the insuffi ciency if the issuer defaults and the collateral 
turns out to be insuffi cient. 49 Moreover, in both covered bond and secured bond 
transactions, it is typical for the cover-pool assets/collateral to be deemed to re-
main on the issuer’s balance sheet for accounting purposes. 50 
 Covered bonds can nonetheless be distinguished from ordinary secured bonds 
in at least one and arguably two ways. 51 Most signifi cantly, the cover-pool assets in 
covered bond transactions are usually ring-fenced, whereas ring-fencing of collat-
eral is not typical of secured bond transactions. 52 The second, arguable distinction 
is that covered bond transactions often require the issuer to replace weak assets 
in the collateral pool by good-quality assets throughout the life of the cov ered 
44. Golin, supra note 28, at 31. Alternatively, public regulatory institutions may monitor licensed cov-
ered bond issuers to ensure the adequacy of their cover pools. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 99.
45. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 98. Temporary substitute assets may be included in the pool 
until permanent replacements are originated, but these, too, are regulated for quantity (as a portion of 
the pool) and quality. Golin, supra note 28, at 31.
46. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 99.
47. Telephone Interview with Folake Shasanya, Dir., Credit Div. of the Ass’n for Fin. Mkts. in Eu-
rope (Aug. 16, 2010).
48. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 96–97.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006).
50. See 1 COVERED BONDS HANDBOOK § 7:3.3, at 7-42 to 7-43 (Anna T. Pinedo & James R. Tanenbaum 
eds., 2010).
51. A third possible distinction is more technical: that in legislative covered bond transactions, 
bankruptcy of the issuer does not necessarily accelerate maturity of the bonds. E-mail from Anna T. 
Pinedo, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to author (Oct. 20, 2010, 16:42 EST) (on fi le with The 
Business Lawyer). Investors therefore can receive their contractual interest-rate bargain even if, at the 
time of bankruptcy, interest rates are lower than the contractual rate. That is one reason why an issuer 
would enter into a GIC or other derivatives contract to invest cover-pool proceeds during a default. 
Cf. supra note 42 (explaining that the purpose is to ensure that the return is suffi cient to cover interest 
on the covered bonds).
52. Compare COVERED BONDS HANDBOOK, supra note 50, § 3:2.2, at 3-6 (discussing “ring-fencing” of 
assets in a case study of German covered bonds), with 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006) (defi ning the scope of 
property included in estate under U.S. federal bankruptcy law).
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bonds to maintain the desired level of overcollateralization. That protection is 
often achieved in secured bond transactions, however, by contractual covenants 
that require the issuer to maintain a minimum level of overcollateralization (or 
that give the issuer the right to augment the collateral to avoid an event of default 
tied to insuffi cient collateral coverage). 53 
 Legislative Versus Structured Covered Bond Regimes 
 Legislative covered bond regimes offer two primary benefi ts to investors and 
issuers: a high degree of certainty regarding the investors’ legal rights and respon-
sibilities in the event of issuer insolvency, and lower transaction costs in structur-
ing a covered bond transaction. Certainty results from the statutory framework. 54 
Transaction costs are low for the same reason—the statutory framework dic-
tates by fi at the protection without the need to engage in complex contractual 
 structuring. 55 
 But legislative covered bond regimes, being confi ned to their statutory frame-
works, are rigid. For example, they often limit the types of collateral that may 
serve as cover-pool assets to such high-quality assets as mortgage loans, 56 public 
sector debt, ship loans, and senior mortgage-backed securities. 57 Furthermore, 
legislative covered bond regimes may be only as protective as the statutory frame-
work provides. 58 For example, Moody’s downgraded the credit ratings of two 
Allgemeine Hypotheken Bank Rheinboden covered bonds in January 2007 be-
cause the bank “could give no legally binding guarantee that it would not reduce 
overcollateralization to the minimum amount required by German law.” 59 
 Structured covered bonds regimes have less legal certainty and higher transac-
tion costs than legislative regimes. Their enforceability (and corresponding in-
vestor protection) will be reliant on the contract, commercial, and insolvency/
bankruptcy law of the relevant jurisdiction, provisions of which may not always 
be tested in court in the ring-fencing context. 60 As a result, structured covered 
53. Telephone Interview with Folake Shasanya, supra note 47.
54. See, e.g., Pfandbriefgesetz [PfandBG] [Pfandbrief Act], May 22, 2005, BGBL. I at 1373, last 
amended by Gesetz [G], Mar. 20, 2009, BGBL. I at 607, § 30 (Ger.), translated in The Pfandbrief Act, 
VERBAND DEUTSCHER PFANDBRIEFBANKEN [ASS’N OF GERMAN PFANDBRIEF BANKS] (updated through 2010 
amendment), http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_11.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011) (establishing the legal provisions for insolvency of covered bond issuers in the Federal Republic 
of Germany).
55. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 91.
56. Most legislative covered bond regimes also restrict eligible mortgage loans based on such cri-
teria as loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios. Id. The European Union’s CRD, for example, limits residential 
mortgage loans eligible for the collateralization of covered bonds to those with an LTV of 80 percent 
or less. 2006 O.J. (L 177) 89.
57. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 90.
58. See JANE SOLDERA & JÖRG HOMEY, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
GERMAN PFANDBRIEF 1 ( July 1, 2010).
59. Jones, supra note 3, at 22–23. Query whether enhanced covered bonds, discussed in supra 
note 28, might have satisfi ed Moody’s concern.
60. Jones, supra note 3, at 22–23; see also Golin, supra note 28, at 33 (noting the lack of covered 
bond defaults and explaining “there is essentially no practical experience with actual covered bond 
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bonds trade with spreads considerably wider than in those countries with national 
legislation. 61 Transaction costs are high because ring-fencing usually requires is-
suers to form complex structures, not dissimilar to those used in securitization 
transactions. In Britain, Canada, and the United States, 62 for example, issuers 
must create a bankruptcy-remote, wholly owned SPV to purchase the cover-pool 
assets for the benefi t of the covered bond. 63 
 The benefi t of a structured covered bond regime is fl exibility. Because the par-
ties are not bound by statute, they can adjust the terms of their covered bond 
program to suit market conditions, available cover assets, and other particular re-
quirements. Thus, structured covered bonds can be tailored, for example, to meet 
higher levels of overcollateralization, asset quality, or substitutability if investors 
so demand. Structured covered bonds could also be issued by companies that are 
not banks or fi nancial institutions. 64 
defaults”). Thus, Deutsche Bank reports that although “Moody’s argues that it is not the existence 
of [overcollateralization] but the legal enforceability of [overcollateralization] after the insolvency 
of the issuer, which is the key for the rating,” the amount of overcollateralization “is not protected 
under most legal frameworks,” making it “doubtful that it will be available to covered bond creditors 
beyond insolvency of the issuer.” DEUTSCHE BANK AG/LONDON, OVERVIEW COVERED BONDS 18 (Feb. 4, 
2009).
61. E-mail from Rick Watson, supra note 28.
62. The U.S. Congress is currently considering enacting a legislative covered bond regime to 
supplement structured covered bond offerings. See supra note 24 (discussing the proposed United 
States Covered Bond Act of 2010). If enacted, banks and other fi nancial institutions would be able 
to issue covered bonds whose cover-pool assets include not only mortgage and public-sector loans 
but also credit card receivables, automobile loans, student loans, and small business loans, as well 
as other types of assets approved by a covered bond regulator (appointed by the U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury). CLIFFORD CHANCE, US COVERED BONDS—PROPOSED LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TO ENCOURAGE 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT 1 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/
publications/2010/04/us_covered_bondsproposedlegislatio.html [hereinafter CLIFFORD CHANCE CLIENT 
MEMORANDUM]. Under the existing proposed legislation, however, each cover pool must be limited to 
only a single type of cover-pool asset, in order to “allow[] for a simpler credit analysis by investors.” Id. 
at 4. The proposed legislation also encompasses that legislative covered bonds would be exempt from 
many federal securities law restrictions. See id. at 7. Otherwise, the proposed U.S. legislative covered 
bond regime would appear to mirror a generic legislative covered bond regime. One reason advanced 
for the creation of a legislative covered bond regime in the United States is that U.S. federal and state 
laws effectively limit the usefulness of a structured regime. Id. at 2–3. The primary limitation is said 
to be that, “under the Uniform Commercial Code, if the issuer defaulted on the [covered] bonds or 
became insolvent, the trustee [for the covered bondholders] would have no option but to sell the cover 
pool assets.” Id. at 3. But query whether that limitation is always applicable under the U.C.C. A party 
secured by “[c]ollateral consisting of rights to payment” can choose to be repaid from collections of 
the collateral, under U.C.C. § 9-607, and need not dispose of the assets under U.C.C. § 9-610. See 
U.C.C. § 9-607 cmt. 2 (2008). But cf. E-mail from Anna T. Pinedo, supra note 51 (observing that when 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation acts as receiver for the issuer, its practice has been to sell 
the cover-pool assets).
63. COVERED BONDS, supra note 18, at 31–33; Somerville, supra note 42, at 41. Covered bonds is-
sued under either framework may require swap agreements to hedge against currency or interest rate 
risk. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 91. Because structured covered bonds are subject to greater 
uncertainty in the event of issuer default, the costs of these swaps are often higher. COVERED BONDS, 
supra note 18, at 31–34; Somerville, supra note 42, at 42.
64. Cf. supra note 47 and accompanying text (observing that issuers of legislative covered bonds are 
typically banks and other government-regulated fi nancial institutions).
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65. See generally SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 13, §§ 3:1–4:12.3, at 3-1 to 4-51.
66. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. Securitization transactions could also achieve 
bankruptcy remoteness by legislative fi at. In the United States, for example, Congress had proposed 
such legislation in section 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001. See SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE, supra note 13, § 4:11, at 4-34 to 4-36. In jurisdictions that enact such enabling legislation, 
securitization would obtain the benefi ts of legislative covered bond regimes: a high degree of certainty 
regarding the investors’ legal rights and responsibilities in the event of issuer insolvency, and lower 
transaction costs. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
67. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED BONDS 16 ( July 2008), avail-
able at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offi ces/General-Counsel/ Documents/US
CoveredBondBestPractices.pdf (“If the value of the pledged collateral exceeded the total amount of all 
valid claims held by the secured parties, this excess value or overcollateralization would be returned 
to the FDIC, as conservator or receiver, for distribution as mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act.”).
68. See supra note 37.
69. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12, at 142–43.
70. Id.
71. On June 15, 2005, the SEC staff released its report on off-balance-sheet transactions. See U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY 
ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE-SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANS-
PARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS (2005). The report focused, among other things, on whether fi nancial 
 B.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COVERED BONDS 
AND SECURITIZATION 
 Covered bond and securitization transactions have signifi cant similarities. The 
most important is that both strive for bankruptcy remoteness—the goal of pro-
tecting covered bond investors in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy. Covered 
bond transactions strive to achieve bankruptcy remoteness through ring-fencing 
or by legislative fi at, as discussed in Part II.A. Securitization transactions achieve 
bankruptcy remoteness by having the company originating the receivables (the 
“originator”) transfer those receivables, in a “true sale” under bankruptcy law, to a 
bankruptcy-remote SPV 65 —steps that can parallel ring-fencing. 66 
 Another important similarity is that after covered bondholders are paid in full, 
and also after securitization investors are paid in full, any residual value from the 
transferred assets is returned for the benefi t of other creditors. 67 
 There are, however, several differences between covered bonds and securitiza-
tion. A primary distinction—and one that has important normative implications—is 
that covered bonds have full recourse to the issuer in the event of a collateral de-
fi ciency whereas securitization constitutes non-recourse fi nancing. 68 Another dis-
tinction is that, in covered bond transactions, the cover-pool assets typically remain 
on the issuer’s balance sheet for accounting purposes whereas, in securitization 
transactions, it has been more typical for the transfer of assets from the originator to 
the SPV to be accounted for as a sale. 69 Such “off-balance-sheet” accounting allows 
the originator to transfer the credit risk of securitized assets to investors and raise 
capital without increasing its balance-sheet leverage. 70 
 This accounting distinction is somewhat artifi cial, however. Securitization transac-
tions can be—and after a 2005 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission staff report 
on off-balance-sheet transactions, increasingly are 71 —structured as on-balance-sheet 
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statements of issuers of securities transparently refl ect the economics of off-balance-sheet arrange-
ments. Id. The report recommended that “transactions and transaction structures primarily motivated 
by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than economics” be discouraged through a combina-
tion of changes to accounting standards by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) and 
greater awareness by participants in the fi nancial reporting process. Id. at 3. The report suggested that 
“improvement in transparency and comparability across issuers can perhaps most directly and quickly 
be accomplished by eliminating the use of . . . structured transactions” whose sole (or perhaps even 
primary) purpose is motivated by accounting treatment. Id. at 46.
72. Cf. Antony Curie et al., Securitization Adds Up: The Cost of Accounting Reform, AM. SECURITIZATION, 
Winter/Spring 2010, at 34, 35 (noting that, at least for non-bank originators, securitization’s funding 
and risk-transfer functions continue to make an attractive fi nancing instrument, even if it must be 
carried on-balance-sheet).
73. Because the factors considered in determining whether a transfer is a true sale for bankruptcy pur-
poses and a sale for accounting purposes are different, it is easy to structure a securitization transaction 
as a bankruptcy sale but an accounting loan. Bankruptcy law criteria govern a true-sale determination. 
See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. Accounting criteria, which tend to be highly technical, 
govern an accounting-sale determination. SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, § 7:4, at 7-10 to 
7-11. For example, until recently, Financial Accounting Standard (“FAS”) 140 allowed an originator who 
sold assets to a “qualifying SPE” to “[d]erecognize all assets sold” on its balance sheet while recording 
the proceeds of the sale. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 140: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities 
¶¶ (9)(b), (11)(a)–(b) (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter FAS 140]. FAS 140 now has been superseded by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s FAS 166 and 167, which eliminate the notion of a qualifying 
SPE, and instead emphasize qualitative analyses to determine whether a special purpose vehicle must be 
consolidated with an originator for accounting purposes. See Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 166: Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets—an amend-
ment of FASB Statement No. 140 ¶ (2)(a) ( June 2009) [hereinafter FAS 166]; Fin. Accounting Standards 
Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 167: Amendments to FASB Interpretation No. 
46(R) ( June 2009) [hereinafter FAS 167]. Sale accounting is dependent on the outcome of an expanded 
bankruptcy-remoteness analysis, the freedom of third-party interest holders to exchange assets, and the 
originator’s surrender of control of the fi nancial assets. FAS 166, supra, ¶ (9)(a)–(c). Consolidation of 
variable interest entities is determined by an extensive analysis to determine the primary benefi ciary of 
such entities. FAS 167, supra, ¶ 14(A)–(G). The changes made in FAS 166 and 167 will themselves be 
incorporated in the FASB’s codifi cation of fi nancial accounting standards. Press Release, Fin. Accounting 
Standards Bd., FASB Accounting Standards Codifi cation™ Launches Today ( July 1, 2009), available 
at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SearchNews?fi lter_year=2009 (follow “July 1, 2009” hyperlink).
74. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12, at 137 & n.17.
75. E-mail from Anna T. Pinedo, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to author (Aug. 23, 2010, 13:58 
EST) (on fi le with The Business Lawyer) (explaining that a “covered bondholder will buy a bullet instru-
ment, with no prepayment risk. In fact, some of the complexity regarding the swaps and the [guaran-
teed investment contracts] or deposit agreements are required to avoid payment acceleration.”).
76. Mortgage-loan securitizations, for example, often bear prepayment risk. Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Regulating Complexity].
77. Prepayment risk, where it exists, can be limited in various ways in the author’s experience, such 
as by pooling mortgage loans and issuing multiple tranches of securities, as well as by utilizing the 
types of swaps, guaranteed investment contracts, and deposit agreements referenced in supra note 75.
transactions. 72 The absence of an accounting benefi t does not undermine securitiza-
tion’s key fundraising and risk-transfer functions. 73 Because bankruptcy remoteness 
is maintained, the originator can still raise capital at signifi cantly lower rates that 
refl ect the creditworthiness of the receivables untainted by the originator’s risks. 74 
 Several characteristics of covered bonds could be either similarities or distinc-
tions, depending on the particular transaction. For example, covered bonds typi-
cally do not bear prepayment risk. 75 But only certain securitization transactions 
bear prepayment risk, 76 and that risk can be contractually limited. 77 Another 
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78. SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, § 4:2, at 4-7 to 4-8.
79. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory 
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2062–63 (2007). Engel and McCoy argue that other securitization 
provisions that accomplish the equivalent of a dynamic cover pool include the provision of a liquidity 
facility in the event of non-performing assets (SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, § 2:1.1, 
at 2-2) and third-party credit enhancement in the form of surety bonds or bank letters of credit 
(SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, § 2:3, at 2-16). Any attempt to use collateral substitu-
tion and recourse clauses in securitization transactions to emulate covered bonds would be subject, 
of course, to any applicable statutory restrictions, such as limitations on substituting collateral for 
securitizations in the United States that rely on REMIC structures.
80. Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 87.
81. SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, §§ 2:1, 2:2, at 2-1, 2-7 to 2-10.
82. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
83. See ANNICK POULAIN, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, EUROPEAN STRUCTURED COVERED BONDS: MOODY’S 
RATING APPROACH (Apr. 10, 2003), available at http://australiansecuritisation.com.au/docs/moodys_
rating_approach.pdf (discussing asset quality as a component of Moody’s rating methodology for cov-
ered bonds).
example is that weak cover-pool assets are typically replaced by good-quality 
assets throughout the life of the covered bonds. In many securitization transac-
tions, however, investors take at least some risk that asset quality may deteriorate 
after purchase. 78 Nonetheless, at least some commentators argue that collateral 
substitution clauses, requiring originators to replace non-performing assets, and 
recourse clauses, requiring originators to retake possession of non-performing 
assets during a certain period after a securitization, could be included in securi-
tization agreements to produce requirements not dissimilar to those of covered 
bonds. 79 
 Another characteristic of covered bonds that could be either a similarity or a 
distinction is the nature of the cover-pool assets. At least historically for legisla-
tive covered bonds, cover-pool assets had been primarily high-quality mortgage 
loans, 80 whereas securitization involves virtually any type of fi nancial asset. 81 But 
this distinction will depend on the transaction. For example, cover-pool assets 
securing legislative covered bonds can now sometimes also include public sec-
tor debt, ship loans, and senior mortgage-backed securities. 82 Structured covered 
bond regimes, on the other hand, have complete fl exibility to select cover-pool 
assets and, as in securitization, are chiefl y concerned with choosing assets that 
will withstand scrutiny by rating agencies. 83 
 III. ANALYSIS 
 This article next engages in a more normative analysis of covered bonds, com-
paring how critiques of securitization would apply to covered bonds and examin-
ing if covered bonds could raise concerns that go beyond the concerns associated 
with securitization. Covered bonds and securitization each present certain costs 
and promise certain benefi ts. In large part, the benefi ts are similar. Both provide 
funds to an issuer or originator at interest rates signifi cantly lower than those paid 
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84. Senior unsecured bank debt often trades at signifi cantly higher rates than either covered bonds 
or ABS, with average spreads in July 2009 well in excess of 250 basis points. Volk, supra note 38, at 
100–01. During that same period, ABS spreads widened far beyond their historical average due to the 
crisis and traded at similar spreads, while covered bond spreads ranged from about sixty basis points 
for German Public Pfandbriefe to over 300 basis points for Irish covered bonds. Id.
85. But cf. A SHORT GUIDE TO COVERED BONDS, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that “covered bonds are typi-
cally more liquid than senior unsecured debt or securitized products”). It is unclear if there is a real 
liquidity differential or whether any differences in liquidity represent apple-and-orange comparisons 
since securitization securities can vary signifi cantly in credit ratings if they represent different tranches 
of a senior-subordinate structure (see infra notes 146–47 and accompanying text), whereas covered 
bonds are not presently issued in senior-subordinate structures. Cf. Packer et al., supra note 11, at 
50 tbl. 3 (observing that one sample of more than 10,000 European covered bonds showed that 95 
percent had at least one triple-A rating).
86. Compare CLIFFORD CHANCE CLIENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 62, at 8 (observing that a U.S. cov-
ered bond market would create “an alternative, private-sector source of funding for residential mort-
gage loans, in competition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”), with SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra 
note 14, § 1:2, at 1-7 to 1-9 (observing a similar use for securitization).
87. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 2, at 604.
88. Indirectly related to moral hazard, the originate-to-distribute model is also said to have fostered 
unscrupulous lending practices. During the housing boom years, thinly capitalized mortgage origina-
tors used securitization to tap into capital markets for funding, allowing them to originate far more 
loans than they would otherwise have been able to. Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization 
Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257, 1262–63 (2009) [hereinafter Eggert, Great 
Collapse]. Some unscrupulous lenders used this model to originate loans to unqualifi ed borrowers, 
quickly selling the loans to mortgage bundlers. Id. at 1285–91 (discussing the increased use of low or 
no documentation underwriting; pressures on appraisers to infl ate the reported values of properties to 
justify higher loan amounts (and higher commissions); occupancy fraud to disguise properties owned 
by real estate speculators as opposed to residents; excessive reliance on quantitative metrics like credit 
scores that are inaccurate indices of mortgage borrower risk; and underwriting only for low, introduc-
tory “teaser rates” when originating adjustable rate mortgages). When the costs from claims against 
a lender by aggrieved consumers exceeded the returns from continued operation, the lender exited 
the market by declaring bankruptcy or reaching a settlement with claimants. Christopher L. Peterson, 
Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2275 (2007).
89. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 387–88 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets]. However, 
on senior unsecured corporate bonds. 84 From an investor perspective, both pre-
sent relatively low-risk investments with liquid secondary markets. 85 Further-
more, both can be used to regenerate lending markets by using collections on 
existing loans to repay securities issued to capital market investors and then using 
the proceeds of those securities to make new loans. 86 
 Commentators have alleged, however, that the costs of securitization are ma-
terially higher than the costs of covered bonds. 87 The analysis below focuses on 
whether those allegations can be supported. 
 MORAL HAZARD 
 Securitization, particularly in residential mortgage markets, faced a consider-
able normative critique in the aftermath of the recent fi nancial crisis. Observers 
argued, for example, that securitization (at least as practiced in the run-up to 
the crisis) created unwarranted moral hazard 88 through the use of an originate-
to-distribute model of mortgage lending. 89 The moral hazard critique is that the 
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in the context of the recent fi nancial crisis in particular, it is important to recognize the limits of 
what fl aws can be ascribed to securitization in general as a fi nancing model. The risks associated 
with the securitization of subprime loans were very nearly unique and their acceptance by inves-
tors was largely fueled by the seemingly boundless appreciation of housing prices, suggesting the 
circumstances of the crisis carry greater weight than securitization as a causal element. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1317–18 (2009) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Future of Securitization].
90. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: SECURITIZATION AND THE MORTGAGE CRISIS 19 
(2010) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT]; Peterson, supra note 88, at 2209. For a contrary view 
on moral hazard and securitization, see Schwarcz, Future of Securitization, supra note 89, at 1319–20 
(arguing that other factors contributed to atrophied underwriting standards such as excess liquidity 
and confl icts of interest within fi rms responsible for underwriting).
91. Eggert, Great Collapse, supra note 88, at 1277; PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, supra note 90, at 5.
92. Eggert, Great Collapse, supra note 88, at 1278.
93. Engel & McCoy, supra note 79, at 2071.
94. Id.
95. Golin, supra note 28, at 18; Surti, supra note 33, at 8.
96. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891–96 (2010) (to be codifi ed at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11). Cf. infra note 134 
(referencing “skin in the game”).
97. See COVERED BONDS, supra note 18, at 31; Burmeister et al., supra note 19, at 97.
98. See supra note 97.
originate-to-distribute model disincentivized conservative mortgage underwriting 
because the lender-originator did not retain its riskiest loans, instead selling them 
off. 90 Lender-originators not subject to those risky loans lacked incentives, for 
example, to screen borrowers and collateral carefully, instead having incentives to 
produce as many saleable loans as possible. 91 Because secondary market purchas-
ers generally needed to examine large numbers of mortgages for securitizations, 
quantitative data from so-called “hard” underwriting was valued above individu-
alized “soft” information, and the latter form of underwriting often fell out of 
favor. 92 Moreover, a number of mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) offerings were 
conducted on a “to-be-announced” basis where investors purchased securities 
prior to the pooling of mortgages. 93 Under such circumstances, purchasers of MBS 
would be unable to conduct any due diligence until after the lender-originator 
had already selected the loans for the transaction. 94 
 Covered bonds, by contrast, are considered by some in the fi nancial industry 
as avoiding moral hazard because issuers of covered bonds often retain owner-
ship of the cover-pool assets, maintaining these assets for accounting purposes 
on their balance sheet. 95 This view, however, is only partly correct. As mentioned, 
securitization transactions themselves can be, and increasingly are, on balance 
sheet. Recent legislative changes in the United States and Europe are also requir-
ing originators to retain a minimum amount of recourse, thereby keeping “skin 
in the game” to minimize moral hazard. 96 Furthermore, in structured covered 
bond deals, originators often sell their assets to a wholly owned, bankruptcy-
remote SPV, which itself issues the bonds. 97 Such a sale would be intended to 
constitute a “true sale” for bankruptcy purposes, exactly as in a securitization 
transaction. 98 
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 99. Engel & McCoy, supra note 79, at 2061–62.
100. Id. at 2062.
101. Id. (claiming that related clauses sometimes call for originators to substitute performing assets 
for those that default).
102. Id. at 2063 (but query whether preventing an originator-servicer from resigning might be 
inconsistent with bankruptcy true-sale criteria, which generally contemplate that the originator be 
engaged as servicer on an arm’s-length basis).
103. Id. at 2073.
104. Id. at 2073 n.166.
105. Id. at 2073–74.
106. Id. at 2075.
107. See Treasury Press Release, supra note 2.
108. Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra note 12, at 141.
 Moreover, contractual provisions offer another possible protection against 
moral hazard in securitization transactions. 99 Investors can require originators to 
warrant that the assets sold in a securitization are compliant with applicable lend-
ing laws or that borrowers meet certain income criteria. 100 Recourse clauses can 
stipulate that if certain trigger events (such as borrower default) occur within a 
specifi ed time after the securitization, the originator must buy back the weak 
asset. 101 It might also be possible to require originators to retain servicing obli-
gations for securitized assets, thereby exposing them to the increased collection 
costs associated with defaults. 102 
 However, contractual protections for investors, at least currently, are of limited 
effect because of their limited use and infrequent enforcement. In many securiti-
zation transactions, few covenants are included, and representations and warran-
ties of asset quality are typically extremely limited. 103 Investors do not regularly 
enforce recourse provisions ,104 and, when they do, they must decide whether 
litigation to compel performance would be cost prohibitive and if the originator 
is even capable of buying back troubled assets. 105 Finally, retention of servicing 
rights by originators is atypical with a well-developed third-party servicer indus-
try at hand to take on such responsibilities for a fee. 106 
 Some have suggested 107 that the incentives to underwrite cover-pool assets bet-
ter, the retention of credit risk by issuers, and the dual recourse available to inves-
tors make covered bonds a safer investment than securitization (particularly of 
MBS) that uses an originate-to-distribute model where credit risk is shifted from 
the originator to the investor and the latter has no recourse to the issuer in the 
event of asset default. For the issuer, the downside risk of covered bonds includes, 
at least, the transaction costs of replacing non-performing or prepaying assets in 
the cover pool and, at worst, claims by covered bondholders against the issuer 
proper if the cover pool is insuffi cient to repay the bonds. The retention of this 
credit risk creates a powerful added incentive to select high-quality assets to serve 
as collateral in a covered bond transaction. 
 In securitization, however, the originator is not without incentives to select 
high-quality assets when structuring a deal. This is because in both covered bond 
 and securitization transactions, the upside reward of residual value 108 from the 
under lying assets is retained by the originator/issuer. Once principal and interest 
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§ 2:4, at 2-17 to 2-18 (describing the senior-subordinate structure).
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pean Crisis 5 (presentation at PRMIA Issues in Securitization Symposium, Washington, D.C., May 3, 
2010) (on fi le with The Business Lawyer) (observing the issuance by DK MCI of “junior covered bonds” 
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ritization transactions. See SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, §§ 2:3–2:4, at 2-15 to 2-18 
(discussing other means of providing credit enhancement).
on the bonds or securitized assets are paid in full, any surplus value redounds to 
the originator/issuer. Covered bonds in which the originator is the issuer achieve 
this by not selling the cover-pool assets. The same result is achieved both for cov-
ered bonds in which the originator is not the issuer and for securitization because, 
in both cases, the originator sells the fi nancial assets to a wholly owned SPV. Once 
the SPV repays its investors, any surplus value redounds to the SPV’s benefi t, and 
that surplus value is then captured by the originator by dividend from, or merger 
with, the SPV. 109 Consequently, originators and issuers of both ABS and covered 
bonds want the fi nancial assets to perform well. 
 ADVERSE SELECTION 
 A related problem with mortgage securitization, some argue, is adverse selec-
tion. 110 Mortgage originators have incentives to exploit information asymmetries 
between themselves and secondary market participants in order to sell their worst 
mortgages while retaining less risky loans on their balance sheet, a variant of 
the “lemons” problem. 111 Securitization, so this argument goes, facilitates adverse 
selection through the senior-subordinate structure, in which originators create 
 senior-priority and junior-priority classes of securities. The junior securities, 
which bear a higher interest rate than the senior securities, are sold to investors 
with a signifi cant appetite for risk, thereby effectively increasing the overcollater-
alization of the senior securities and making them less risky. 112 
 One might question that adverse selection criticism. Even though investors in 
junior securities have a signifi cant appetite for risk, they are, or at least should 
be, sophisticated enough to ensure that the risk they are taking is properly com-
pensated by the interest rate. If only the worst mortgages support repayment of 
the junior securities, that interest, much less the principal, on the junior securi-
ties would unlikely be paid. Furthermore, to the extent securitization’s use of 
senior- subordinate structures  could facilitate adverse selection, covered bonds 
would not be immune. Although most covered bonds are not currently issued 
in senior- subordinate structures, 113 some are 114 —and nothing prevents the more 
widespread use of  senior-subordinate structures in non-legislative covered bonds 
transactions. 115 
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mum quality cover-pool assets; especially where there is a dynamic pool, there should be relatively few 
“lemons.” See supra note 111 and accompanying text. But investors in securitization transactions can 
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118. Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good for Business 
and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifi cations?, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 279, 
287–88 (2007) [hereinafter Eggert, Comment]; Schwarcz, Future of Securitization, supra note 89, at 
1322.
119. Eggert, Comment, supra note 118, at 287–88.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 290.
122. Id.
 The problem of adverse selection can arise, however, even absent a senior-
subordinate structure, and covered bonds are clearly susceptible. 116 Nonetheless, 
they should be somewhat less susceptible to adverse selection than securitization 
because dual recourse gives holders of covered bonds a claim against the issuer if 
adversely selected cover-pool assets are insuffi cient. 117 
 SERVICING COSTS 
 An additional criticism leveled against securitization in the wake of the fi nan-
cial crisis is that it inhibits modifi cation of the underlying mortgage loans for 
troubled borrowers because of restrictions contained in agreements with third-
party loan servicers or because alterations require consent from diffuse MBS hold-
ers. 118 Servicing agreements typically oblige servicers to manage loans in the “best 
interests” of MBS holders, a somewhat ambiguous standard that might expose 
servicers to liability for even good-faith decisions if, in retrospect, investors suffer 
harm. 119 Servicing agreements also often include absolute restrictions on changing 
the terms of loans, limits on the number of modifi cations for a given asset pool 
or for a given loan over its lifetime, maximization of the net present value of cash 
fl ows (even at the cost of foreclosure on a potentially salvageable loan), and the 
requirement of consent from outside parties such as bond insurers, rating agen-
cies, and credit enhancement providers before altering more than 5 percent of the 
loans in a mortgage pool. 120 
 Structural credit enhancements may also inhibit modifi cations to securitized 
mortgage loans when the interests of different tiers of investors are pitted against 
each other, in a phenomenon dubbed “tranche warfare.” 121 Asset-backed securities 
with different tranches corresponding to different investor classes are sometimes 
subject to “performance clauses” establishing conditions precedent to changing 
the overcollateralization of the asset pool or releasing principal to investors in 
lower tiers. 122 The treatment of modifi ed loans for such “trigger tests” determines 
how the reduced value of the mortgage pool will be distributed among investors; 
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Mortgage Contract Modifi cations, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107 (2009) [hereinafter White, Deleveraging]; Alan M. 
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Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2009) [hereinafter White, Rewriting Contracts].
127. White, Deleveraging, supra note 126, at 1112–13.
128. Id. at 1113.
129. Id. at 1116.
130. Data Report, HOPE NOW (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.hopenow.com/industry-data.
php.
131. White, Rewriting Contracts, supra note 126, at 514–15.
132. White, Deleveraging, supra note 126, at 1128–29.
133. Interestingly, one of White’s key fi ndings is that servicers’ fi duciary obligation to MBS inves-
tors is actually not well served by foreclosures since losses incurred are actually six times larger than 
the average principal or interest write-off in a modifi cation. This suggests the chief impediment to 
modifi cation may not be securitization per se, but rather inadequately drafted servicing contracts that 
do not allow servicers the fl exibility necessary to protect investors’ interests. See id. at 1119; see also 
Eggert, Comment, supra note 118, at 288.
if modifi ed loans are treated as current, subordinate investor classes benefi t, while 
senior classes are protected if modifi ed loans are treated as delinquent. 123 Eggert 
concludes that “[t]he complex webs that securitization weaves can be a trap and 
leave no one, not even those who own the loans, able to effectively save borrowers 
from foreclosure.” 124 
 Empirical studies reveal that, even in the face of enormous government pres-
sure to adjust mortgage terms for the benefi t of homeowners, 125 actual mortgage 
restructuring lags behind expectations, in part due to the structural complica-
tions of securitization. 126 In his most comprehensive study of mortgage modifi ca-
tions, Alan White examined data on 3.5 million securitized subprime and alt-A 
loans for the month of November 2008. 127 In the November data, White found 
233,000 mortgages in foreclosure and 69,000 in bankruptcy while lenders made 
only 21,219 modifi cations that month. 128 Of these modifi cations, only 10 percent 
included some reduction in interest or principal or a forgiveness of fees. 129 The 
most recent available data show just over 4.3 million total completed mortgage 
modifi cations between the last half of 2007 and February 2011 while, between 
August 2010 and February 2011, the number of loans more than sixty days de-
linquent declined gradually, from about 3.2 million to about 2.8 million. 130 White 
points to securitization 131 and the strictures of third-party servicing agreements 132 
as part of the reason for the low level of modifi cation and the inability of troubled 
borrowers to obtain debt relief. 133 
 Covered bond proponents claim that covered bonds have more fl exibility to ac-
commodate troubled borrowers because loans in the cover pool remain with the 
originator/issuer, which could service these loans and modify them as appropri-
580 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 66, May 2011
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135. SCHWARCZ STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 14, § 4:5, at 4-10.
136. Cf. COVERED BONDS HANDBOOK, supra note 50, § 4:3.7, at 4-17 (discussing how loan servicers 
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137. See Eggert, Comment, supra note 118, at 87–88. Cf. Golin, supra note 28, at 31 (discussing the 
restrictions placed on substitutions for cover-pool assets in most covered bond regimes).
138. See, e.g., 19A AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Secured Transactions § 253:1949 (2005) (providing a 
standard term for secured loans with intangible collateral specifying the permissible procedures for the 
debtor’s “collection, compromising, or enforcing of any account, chattel paper, or general intangible” 
and providing for default if the debtor deviates from such procedures).
139. Schwarcz, Future of Securitization, supra note 89, at 1323; Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, 
supra note 76, at 216–17.
140. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity, supra note 76, at 222; see also Eggert, Great Collapse, supra 
note 88, at 1277 (explaining how investors in mortgage-backed securities moved away from individu-
alized risk assessments to data-driven “hard underwriting” practices).
ate. 134 There are, however, at least two factors that restrict such fl exibility: (a) modi-
fi cations resulting in reduced collections from the cover-pool assets may expose the 
originator/issuer to recourse for a defi ciency; and (b) non-performing or adjusted 
assets that decrease the value of the cover pool below the agreed level of over-
collateralization may require asset replacement, creating additional costs for the 
originator/issuer. Even in a covered bond context, therefore, the originator/issuer 
will have to balance the costs of modifi cation against those of foreclosure and non-
action in determining whether and how to accommodate troubled borrowers. 
 Additionally, the servicing of underlying fi nancial assets in covered bond and 
securitization transactions often converge. In securitization transactions, for ex-
ample, the originator often acts as the servicer. 135 And in covered bond transac-
tions, originators/issuers could contract with third-party loan servicers despite 
on-balance-sheet accounting. 136 Moreover, with both covered bond and securiti-
zation transactions, investors themselves can contractually restrict the originator/
issuer’s right to modify the underlying fi nancial assets, 137 a type of restriction that 
is not atypical of covenants in an ordinary secured loan agreement. 138 The extent 
to which covered bond transactions have more fl exibility than securitization trans-
actions to accommodate troubled borrowers is thus highly context dependent. 
 OVERRELIANCE ON COMPLEX MATHEMATICAL MODELS 
 Complex asset-backed securities of the type commonly issued prior to the 
recent fi nancial crisis defi ed easy analysis and led both investors and ratings 
agencies to rely on mathematical models to assess the risks of such securities. 139 
Securities ratings became an attractive heuristic device for investors with neither 
the time nor inclination to comprehend fully the risks entailed in securitization 
transactions. 140 The models from which these ratings derived were themselves 
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145. Coval, Jurek & Stafford, supra note 143, at 5–6. The process can be compounded where 
tranches from different CDOs are themselves pooled to create a new CDO, often called “CDO-squared 
(CDO2).” Id. at 8.
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id.
148. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 89, at 104–05.
149. Id.
150. Coval, Jurek & Stafford, supra note 143, at 10.
151. Note that where covered bonds are backed only by public sector securities issued by a single 
government entity, the risk assessment is greatly simplifi ed as it can focus on the single source of the 
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fl awed due to their reliance on misleading historical data 141 or pure assumption 
when historical data did not exist. 142 
 Moreover, certain highly leveraged asset-backed securities, especially asset-
backed securities of collateralized debt obligations (“ABS CDO”), turned out to be 
diffi cult to value and extremely sensitive to errors in initial credit-risk estimates. 143 
Collateralized debt obligation, or “CDO,” securities are issued with the backing of a 
pool of various mortgage loans or other fi nancial assets held by an SPV, the proceeds 
of which supply the funds for repayment of the securities. 144 The securities may be 
issued in senior-subordinate tranches to enhance structurally the credit rating of the 
upper tranches. 145 The tiers allocate the default risk of the cover-pool assets, with se-
nior tranches being paid before mezzanine tranches, which, in turn, are paid before 
junior tranches. 146 Any shortfall in returns from the pooled assets is thus absorbed 
by the lower tranches fi rst, shielding senior tranches and allowing those securities 
to receive a higher credit rating than the average rating of the underlying assets. 147 
ABS CDO securities operate in a similar fashion but are backed by mixed pools 
of ABS and/or MBS securities in a process sometimes called “re-securitization.” 148 
Here, repayment derives from the returns on the assets underlying the pooled ABS 
and MBS securities. 149 Relatively small variances in assumptions about the default 
probability of assets underlying tranches of CDO or ABS CDO securities as well as 
the level of correlation between the default rates of different securitized assets can 
be magnifi ed by the ABS CDO structure, resulting in very different outcomes than 
investors bargained for when they purchased the securities. 150 
 Covered bonds, at least those issued in legislative regimes that have strict cover-
pool regulations and no tranching ability, are inherently less risky than subprime 
mortgage-backed securities. Nevertheless, they may be susceptible to at least 
some of the pressures that led to an overreliance on modeling in securitization 
markets. Investors in covered bonds must determine the risks associated with 
large pools of mortgage loans or other assets, often valued in billions of dollars. 151 
582 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 66, May 2011
152. Fitch Ratings calls this “the discontinuity factor” and defi nes it as “the likelihood of an inter-
ruption . . . of payment on the covered bonds in case of a default of the issuing institution.” STEFAN 
POTOCKI ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COVERED BONDS 2008/09, at 3 (May 6, 2009).
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Additionally, covered bond investors must account for the default risk of the is-
suing entity and the extent to which this may impact the solvency of the cover 
pool. 152 High quality-control standards for cover-pool assets, overcollateralization, 
and thorough hedging against asset-liability mismatch may reduce the risks faced 
by covered bond investors, 153 but they do not make those risks any easier to cal-
culate accurately. 
 The analysis so far has shown that most costs of securitization are not necessarily 
materially different than the costs of covered bonds. The view that securitization 
fosters, whereas covered bonds avoid, moral hazard is only partly correct. It has 
no application to the increasing number of securitization transactions that do not 
depend on off-balance-sheet accounting, and moral hazard should be mitigated if 
not eliminated by increasing government (and investor) requirements that secu-
ritization originators retain a minimum amount of recourse. The extent to which 
covered bond transactions have more fl exibility than securitization transactions 
to accommodate troubled borrowers is highly context dependent. And covered 
bonds, like securitization, may be susceptible to the same types of pressures that led 
to an overreliance on modeling in securitization markets. Although dual recourse 
makes covered bonds somewhat less susceptible than securitization to adverse se-
lection, the discussion below shows that dual recourse can make covered bonds 
more costly than securitization from the standpoint of non-adjusting creditors. 154 
 IMPACTS ON NON-ADJUSTING CREDITORS 
 Secured debt instruments and securitization often prompt concerns surround-
ing their effi ciency and potential negative impact on the unsecured creditors of 
a borrower or originator. 155 These concerns are rooted in the Modigliani-Miller 
hypothesis that when a fi rm realizes savings through a change in one part of 
its capital structure it will,  ceteris parabus , see offsetting costs to other parts of 
its capital structure. 156 This theory led to two subsidiary claims: fi rst, that unse-
cured creditors of fi rms benefi ting from interest rate savings (through a secured 
debt issue or through a securitization) will raise their interest rates by an amount 
equivalent to the fi rm’s savings to compensate for their increased risk in the event 
of insolvency, 157 and, second, that unsecured creditors who cannot adjust their 
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interest rates (“non-adjusting creditors”) are subject to an uncompensated transfer 
of risk from new secured creditors. 158 Observers have argued at length that both 
of these claims are exaggerated and that, in almost all cases, non-adjusting credi-
tors actually benefi t from the liquidity provided by securitization and secured 
debt. 159 However, because covered bonds are to a certain extent a hybrid, com-
bining aspects of both securitization and secured debt, it is worth recapitulating 
some of these discussions and analyzing covered bonds from the standpoint of 
non-adjusting creditors of their issuer. 
 Generally, a new-money secured debt issue does not harm non-adjusting credi-
tors and may actually benefi t them. 160 The net impact on the assets available to 
non-adjusting creditors of a lien securing a new-money loan is, at least at the out-
set, zero; the proceeds from the loan are available to repay the newly incurred se-
cured debt. 161 Non-adjusting creditors would only be prejudiced to the extent that 
either the company’s risk of insolvency increases or the company “overinvests” the 
proceeds, reducing their value. 162 Because overinvestment is a generic risk for any 
company, 163 the analysis below treats it as a neutral factor. 
 It is highly unlikely that new-money secured debt will increase a company’s risk 
of insolvency. To the contrary, access to credit and the resulting liquidity generally 
forestalls bankruptcy 164 and increases the expected value of non-adjusting credi-
tor claims, even with conservative assumptions. 165 If a company’s fi nancial situa-
tion is so precarious that it appears to have a realistic chance of going bankrupt 
even after borrowing new money, lenders would be reluctant to make the loan, 
even with collateral, because of the inherent imperfections in the bankruptcy sys-
tem. 166 Thus, the extension of new-money secured credit to a fi rm usually  reduces 
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its chances of becoming bankrupt, thereby having a neutral or positive impact on 
the fi rm’s non-adjusting creditors. 167 
 Securitization, much like a new-money loan, would not have a net adverse im-
pact on non-adjusting creditors of a company to the extent it entails the exchange 
of one type of asset (e.g., mortgage loans, automotive loans, or other fi nancial 
assets) for another asset, cash. 168 Once again, only if securitization increases the 
company’s risk of insolvency or the company “overinvests” the proceeds of the 
securitization will it harm non-adjusting creditors. 169 And, once again, because 
increased liquidity generally reduces the risk of insolvency and lenders avoid fi -
nancing truly risky fi rms, securitization is likely to benefi t non-adjusting creditors 
by increasing the likelihood they will be repaid in full in the long-term. 170 
 How do non-adjusting creditors fare when a company issues covered bonds? 
Similar to a securitization, covered bonds would always result in a new money 
infusion for the company by leveraging assets for cash. 171 Like a securitization, 
covered bonds require some level of overcollateralization to account for the 
under lying risk of the asset pool (such level of overcollateralization being dictated 
by law in legislative regimes 172 ). Therefore, covered bonds are roughly equivalent 
to a securitization in their neutral immediate impact on non-adjusting creditors. 
As before, non-adjusting creditors are only harmed to the extent a covered bond 
issue increases the issuer’s chance of bankruptcy or there is overinvestment of the 
proceeds of the bond issue. And, once again, it is likely that a company with a 
substantial default risk would not be able to issue covered bonds because of the 
wariness of investors. 
 Covered bonds, however, go beyond securitization in two ways that can harm 
non-adjusting creditors. In a securitization, if the overcollateralization is insuffi -
cient to repay investors, the investors take a loss because they only have recourse 
to assets that the SPV has already purchased. 173 The pool of assets available for 
repayment is, in other words, effectively fi xed or static. 174 In contrast, in covered 
bond transactions, the cover pools are usually dynamic, 175 requiring the covered 
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bond issuer continually to segregate new assets as needed to maintain overcollat-
eralization—thereby enabling the covered bonds to continue to be paid in priority 
to unsecured claims. 176 
 Covered bonds also go beyond securitization in their recourse. Whereas secu-
ritization transactions are non-recourse, 177 covered bonds have dual recourse. 178 
If, therefore, the cover-pool assets are insuffi cient, covered bondholders have a 
recourse claim against the issuer. 179 That claim, being  pari passu with unsecured 
creditor claims, 180 would further dilute non-adjusting creditor recovery. 181 
 As a result of the dynamic cover pool and dual recourse, covered bond transac-
tions thus shift virtually all risk to non-adjusting creditors. 
 IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 Covered bonds have a long and distinguished pedigree, originating under the 
rule of King Frederick the Great in order to generate mortgage fi nancing for Prus-
sia’s landed gentry, who had been battered by the Seven Years War. Although 
historically limited to European fi nance, covered bonds are now becoming an 
important part of North American and Asian fi nance. There is great confusion, 
though, about the nature of covered bonds and their similarities to, and differ-
ences from, secured bond fi nancing and securitization. 
 This article attempts to demystify covered bonds, examining their utility as a 
fi nancing tool and analyzing their legal rights and obligations. In these contexts, 
the article compares covered bonds with bond fi nancing and securitization and 
also compares the costs and benefi ts of covered bonds and securitization, seeking 
to give covered bonds perspective within a fi nancing hierarchy. 
 The benefi ts of covered bonds and securitization are similar. Both provide an 
issuer with low-cost capital market funding while offering investors relatively 
low-risk and liquid investments, and both can be used to regenerate lending mar-
kets. 
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182. One commentator asks how this asymmetric allocation of risk is different from that created by 
ordinary secured claims. E-mail from Anna T. Pinedo, supra note 51. There are at least two important 
differences: ordinary secured claims do not have dynamic collateral pools and their collateral is not 
protected from bankruptcy risks.
 Covered bonds are more likely than securitization, however, to harm non-
adjusting creditors. Both forms of fi nancing pay their investors from segregated 
asset pools; but whereas securitization effectively fi xes the segregated asset pool, 
thereby allocating risk to all parties, the asset pool for covered bonds is usually 
“dynamic,” requiring the covered bond issuer to continue to segregate assets as 
needed to repay the covered bonds, in priority to paying unsecured claims. Fur-
thermore, if those assets are ultimately insuffi cient to repay the covered bonds, 
covered bondholders have a legal claim against the issuer that is equal and rat-
able with claims of unsecured creditors, thereby further diluting repayment of the 
latter’s claims. The extent to which risk should be allocated so asymmetrically to 
unsecured creditors is a policy question that any nascent covered bond regime 
should address. 182 
